IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA NORTHERN DIVISION

LONNIE THOMAS FUNDERBURK

#158 627

Plaintiff, *

v. * 2:07-CV-1039-MEF (WO)

B&R WRECKER SERVICE, et al., *

Defendants. *

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff is an inmate incarcerated at the Kilby Correctional Facility located in Mt. Meigs, Alabama. He files this action for damages and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaining that Defendants violated his constitutional rights by refusing to return to him his impounded truck and the contents contained therein. Plaintiff names as defendants B&R Wrecker Service and Billy Rayburn, owner/manager of the towing company.

Upon review of the complaint, the court concludes that dismissal of this case prior to service of process is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

I. DISCUSSION

An essential element of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is that the alleged constitutional deprivation was committed by persons acting under color of state law whose conduct is reasonably attributable to the State. *American Manufacturers Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sullivan*, 526 U.S. 40 (1999); *Parratt v. Taylor*, 451 U.S. 527 (1981); *Willis v. University Health*

Services, Inc., 993 F.2d 837, 840 (11th Cir. 1993). To state a viable claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must assert that he was "deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law. Like the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, the under-color-ofstate-law element of § 1983 excludes from its reach "merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful," Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002, 102 S.Ct. 2777, 73 L.Ed.2d 534 (1982) (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948))." American Manufacturers, 526 U.S. at 49-50. Consequently, the Supreme Court has repeatedly insisted "that state action requires both an alleged constitutional deprivation 'caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the State is responsible,' and that 'the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.' Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982); see Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978)." Id.

Here, there is no allegation that Defendants act under color of state law or may be considered state actors. *See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.*, 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974) ("[t]he mere fact that a business is subject to state regulation does not by itself convert its action into that of the State for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment."); *Rendell-Baker v. Kohn*, 457 U.S. 830, 841 (1982) (acts of "private contractors do not become the acts of the government [simply] by reason of their . . . engagement in . . . public contracts" regardless of whether such engagement is "significant or even total."). Plaintiff's claims against the

named defendants are, therefore, frivolous and due to be dismissed pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). *See Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).

II. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that Plaintiff's complaint be DISMISSED with prejudice prior to service of process under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

It is further

ORDERED that the parties are DIRECTED to file any objections to the Recommendation on or before December 28, 2007. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation to which a party objects. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the Magistrate Judge's report shall bar the party from a *de novo* determination by the District Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. *Nettles v. Wainwright*, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). *See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc.*, 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982). *See also Bonner v. City of Prichard*, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (*en banc*), adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on

September 30, 1981.

DONE, this 14th day of December, 2007.

/s/ Susan Russ Walker SUSAN RUSS WALKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE